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THE ATTITUDINAL LEGACY OF
COMMUNIST LABOR RELATIONS
DAVID G. BLANCHFLOWER and RICHARD B. FREEMAN*
This study of workers' altitudes compares data from International
Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys for former commuiiisi coun-
tries in Europe with ISSP data for Western countries over the period
1987-93, which covers the beginning of the transition to a market
economy for the former communist countries. Omsistent with their
hypothesis that communist-run economies left an altiiiidinal "legacy,"
the authors find that the citizens of former communist coiiirtries evinced
a greater desire for egalitarianism, iess satisfaction with their jobs, and
more support for strong trade unions and state intervention in the job
market and economy than did Westerners. Over the course of the
period studied, however, residents of the former communist F.iiropean
counti ies perceived sizable increases in occupational earnings differen-
lial.s, and they adjusted their views of the differeniials that "ought to"
exist in their economies in the direction of greater inequality.
L abor relations in communist t'cono-mies has diverged historically from that
in free market economies. Under commti-
nism nearly all workersjoined official "trans-
mission belt" unions tliat operated as an
arm of the state rather than as independent
representatives of workers. The state set
wages, prices, and enterprise budgets in
ways that created huge job vacancies with
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no open unemployment, and prodticed low
real wages and narrow skill and sectoral pay
differentials. These practices resulted in
inefficieni allocations of labor (Freeman
1992). AI the same time, there was a social
ethos favoring egalitarianism (Burawoy
1985; Kornai 1980). While most analysts
believe that communist labor practices pro-
duced demoralized and disgrtinlled work-
ers, there have been no comparisons of
worker attitudes in historically communist
economies and market economies using
comparable stirvey instrtiments that docu-
ment or test this expectation.'
'Three papers have used attitudinal data to exam-
ine the development of markets in general, but not
specifically labor markets, in eastern Kmope. Akerlof
andYellen (1991) looked at various attitudesof work-
ers in East Germany and comparable workers in West
Industrial and Labor Rrlations Revimi, Vol. 50, No. 3 (April 1997).
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To what extent do workers in tradition-
ally communist societies differ from work-
ers in the West in their attitudes toward
working conditions, wage inequality, job
satisfaction, and the role of unitjns and the
state in determining labor market out-
comes? To what extent can any observed
differences be attributed to the "legacy" of
the communist past? How have attitudes
changed during the transition to a market
economy?
In this study we use data from the Inter-
national Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
to try to answer those questions."- Each year
the ISSP focuses on a particular topic. Tbe
topics most relevant to our area of inquiry
are "social inequality" (the 1992 and 1987
modules), "work orientation" (the 1989
module, supplemented by preliminary evi-
dence from the 1993 module),' and "the
role of government" (1990).^ We have
information on seven ex-communist coun-
tries: Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, East Ger-
many, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Rus-
sia. Most of these countries reported in the
1992 module. For Hungary and Poland, we
Germany. Shiller et al. (1991) compared random
samples of lhe Moscow and New York populaiionK in
their attUudcs toward free markeiH. In another pa-
per, Sliiller ci al. (1992) studied individual atliludes
in three ex-coinniiinisi coimtrifs—Russia, Ukraine,
and East Germany—and compared them with indi-
vidual attitudes in lliree adviuued capitalist econo-
mies—the United Stares, Japan, and Wesi Germany.
In addition, Rose and Haerpfer (1994) contrasted
atliludes toward lhe transformation olex-communisi
socipties. and Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski (199.^ )
examined Polish opinion concerning privatization
and !<tate interventionisni.
"•'The ISSP is a continuing program ol cross-na-
tional collaboration carried out by a group of na-
tional re.searcb institutes, each of which conducts an
annual survey of social attitudes and values, li brings
together pre-existing national social science surveys
and coordinates iheir research lo produce a cotnnmn
sel of questions asked in identical form in the partici-
pating nations.
^We refer to this evidence as prelitiiinar\' because
it is taken from means for the survey published hy lhe
ISSP. The computer Illes were not available for
analysis al the lime of our study.
'Forearlierwork using these data, see Blanchflower
and Freeman (1992) and Blaiichflower and Oswald
{1989, 1994).
have information in several ISSP modules,
which allows us to analyze changes in labor
outcomes and attitudes over time. Appen-
dix Table Al reports the number of re-
sponses by counti-y and year.
Measuring The Communist
Legacy in the Labor Market
Like any other lengthy historical experi-
ence, decades of commtmist rule in eastern
Europe and Russia have arguably left a
"legacy" of effects on workers and the job
market that successor market economies
must deal with. There is a potential labor
market outcome legacy: narrow wage dis-
tributions; distinct work practices (Haraszti
1978; Burawoy and Lukacs 1992); relations
with management that diverge from those
in historically capitalist economies
(Burawoy 1985; Kornai 1980); high rates of
union membership in unions dominated
by communist regimes; dependence of firms
on the state; and enterprise provision of
many social benefits. In addition, there is
a potential "attitudinal legacy" in terms of
workers' views about institutions and mar-
kets due to experience tnidcr communism
and decades of communisi propaganda.
To be sure, institutions, labor market
outcomes, and attitudes are likely to differ
among ex-communist countries, just as they
do among Western countries. Poland and
Hungary differ in the nature of their former
communist systems and in the characteris-
tics of their movement to a market economy,
just as Sweden and Norway differ from the
Lfnited States and the United Kingdom.
National differences notwithstanding, how-
ever, the operative hypothesis of tbis study
is that the communist experience was suffi-
ciently similar to leave an identifiable com-
mon legacy affecting outcomes and views of
the labormarket in the ex*<:ommuni.ststates.
This is a hypothesis about cross-national
differences due to comparable experiences,
and as such is subject to the problems of
assessmentcommon to such analyses (Kohn
1989).
A priori, what form might this legacy take?
By itnposing narrow wage distributions
through governmental fiat, and pressing
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an egalitarian ethos, communism should
have iniluenced attitudes toward earnings
inequality and government interventions
in labor market outcomes. We anticipate
three differences in attitudes between work-
ers in ex-communist and Western coun-
tries: (1) employees in ex-communist coun-
tries will be more favorable toward narrow
wage distributions and government inter-
ventions to attain them; (2) given the per-
sistence of poor working conditions in
former communist countries (in which
workers were deprived of normal market
modes of responding to such conditions,
having neither the "exit" option of finding
employment outside the state-run sector
nor lhe "voice" option of forming free trade
unicms), employees in those countries will
evince less job satisfaction than workers in
Western countries; and (3) workers in ex-
communist countries will have more posi-
tive attitudes toward free trade unions than
do workers in the West. In addition, assum-
ing that attitudes toward inequality respond
to actual levels of inequality, we expect that
the views in ex-communist countries to-
ward wage differences will change over time,
as competitive markets produce greater
inequality.
We examine the ISSP for evidence of
such "legacies" in two ways. First, we con-
trast responses to ISSP questions (both
outcome and attitude items) in ex-commu-
nist countries with those in Western coun-
tries, controlling for respondents' indi-
vidual characteristics. This is effectively an
exercise in estimatingcountry dummy vari-
ables: the test of the legacy hypothesis is
whether there is a common pattern among
the dummy variables for ex-communist
countries. Second, we probe the correlates
and investigate possible objective causes
for any observed differences. This is an
effort to explain differences between ex-
communist countries and Western coun-
tries in terms of actual or perceived labor
market factors.
In attitude surveys, the validity and reli-
ability of measures are invariably of some
concern. Because none of our data are
longitudinal, we cannot determine whether
the same person would respond similarly to
the same question in a second interview,
which would give us test-retest measure-
ment errors. This does not mean, however,
that we have no way to assess the quality of
responses. We perform three checks on
individual responses: (1) we examine
whether individual responses fit a pattern—
for instance, whether workers who are com-
pletely satisfied with their jobs also express
more willingness than others to work with-
out pay; (2) we relate individual responses
to objective characteristics: are workers
who want a more narrow wage distribution
high or low in that distribution?; and (3) we
inve.stigate whether people with the same
characteristics give comparable responses
in different surveys. The results of all of
these checks suggest that responses on the
ISSP are consistent/'
Characteristics of ex-Communist
and Western Data Samples
P'or our cross-section analyses of workers
in ex-communist economies and market
economies, we rely heavily on the 1992
ISSP, which provides data on seven ex-com-
munist countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, East Germany, Hungary, Poland,
Russia, and Slovenia) supplemented by the
1993 ISSP. For our analysis of changes over
time, we use the 1987 and 1992 ISSP sur-
veys, which contain comparable informa-
tion for Hungary and Poland. None of
these data files are ideal. Relatively few
•''As examples of our checks, we found that 24% of
ihosf compleicly sjnisfied with iheir job agreed
strongly ihal they would work without pay, compared
to Ifss than 10% of those who were di.ssatisfied, 13%
who were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, and soon.
Also, we conlirmcd that greater ine<]uality was fa-
vored by the more educated (see Table 2) and those
with high earnings (table available from authors on
request); we found, from a comparison of responses
on similar questions in 1987 and 1992, that year.s of
schooling had a comparable effect in both years (see
coefficients reported in Tahle 2); and we confirmed
that age. sex, and marital status al.so had comparable
effects in both years. In addition, we explfired indi-
vidual differences in responses to the Table 7 ques-
tions and found that people with similar demographic
characteristics responded in the same direction.
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workers in the ISSP for the ex-communist
countries report being in the private sec-
tor, which prevents us from making infer-
ences about differences between those
employees, who will constitute the bulk of
future employment, and employees of state-
owned firms. For our comparison group we
have data from eleven OECD countries in
1987 or 1992 (Australia, Austria, Canada,
Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, West Ger-
many, and the United States) plus informa-
tion on other variables of interest on six
other countries (Israel, Japan, tbe Philip-
pines, Southern Ireland, Spain, and Swe-
den) in other years of the ISSP.**
We compare the former communist states
with a set of Western countries rather than
with a single one because differences be-
tween the eastern European countries and
any particular Western country, such as the
United States, could be due to the distinct
characteristics of that Western country
rather than to the legacy of communist
labor practices vis-a-vis market economies
in general. The danger of this approach,
however, is that we may miss important
contrasts between more narrowly defined
groups, say between East Germany and West
Germany. To deal with this danger, we
present all calculations with individual
country dummies before giving broader ex-
communist versus traditional market
economy contrasts.
Attitudes Toward Inequality
As a starting point for analyzing differ-
ences in views toward inequality between
persons in ex-communist economies and
those in traditional capitalist economies,
we examined responses to the 1992 ISSP
I^n a number of cases the data were coHecied in a
dilTerem year rrom ihat reported. For example,
Crrai Briiain did iiol conduct a survey in 1988; ihe
reported data were collected in 1989. Half the 1089
respondents were asked tlie quesuons tVom tlie 1988
ISSP and the olher hall'were asked the qucsiions from
(he 1989 romponent. In a few cases, such as Italy in
1988. 1989. 1990. and 1991 and Auslria in 1987 and
1988, lhe same group of respondents were asked the
two years of questions.
qtiestion: "Are differences in income in
this country too large?" The difference
between the ex-communist countries and
the West is stark.' Save for Italy, there is
only the barest overlap in the suiTey re-
sponses. On average. 52% of respondents
in the ex-commttiiist countries expressed a
strong belief that income differences were
too large, compared to 30% of respondents
in Western countries. Most striking, per-
haps, are the differences between citizens
in the ex-communist countries and those in
Scandinavia, where incomes are more
equally distributed than in most capitalist
economies and where the social democratic
egalitarian ethos is strong. In Sweden and
Norway, just 23-24% of respondents be-
lieved income differences were too large.
We pursue the analysis of differences in
views toward inequality across countries
using two questions on the 1987 and 1992
ISSPs on pay by occupation. In those years
the ISSP asked individuals in difierent coun-
tries "what people earn each year" and wbat
they "otight to earn" in 11 occupations. In
each of the two years, seven of these occu-
pational groups were identical, while four
were different." We used the reported fig-
ures on what people earn to estimate a
measure of "perceived differentials" and
used the reported figures on what they
ought to earn to estimate "appropriate dif-
ferentials."'' We calculated from these re-
'The percentages agreeing strongly that differ-
ences in income were too large were as follows: Bul-
garia. 85%; Easl Germany 61 %; Russia. 59%: Slovenia,
48%: Poland, 42%: C/,ech Republic, 3ti%. Hungary
35%: Italy, 53%; Great Britain. 37%, Austria, 35%.
WestGcrniany,31%.NewZealand, 30%, United States,
28%. Canada. 2(i%; Sweden, 24%; Norway, 23%: and
Australia, 18%.
"The occupational categories available in both
years were doctor, small shopkeeper, chairman of
large national company, skilled factory worker, farm
worker, unskilled factory worker, and cabinet minis-
ter. In 1987 the remaining four categories were
bricklayer, bank clerk, secretary, and bus driver,
whereas in 1992 they wt-rtMcplaced by solicitor, shop
assistant in a department store, owner/manager of a
factory, and appeal court judge.
"Summaries of the mean earnings by country iti
the two categories are reported in a data appendix
that is available on request from the authors.
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sponses the standard deviation of the natu-
ral log of the averages leported in these
appendix tables for each country.
The resultant statistic does not measure
what survey respondents believe occupa-
tional differentials should be. They were
not asked about occupational differentials
per se, but rather about occupatiotial pay.
But itiiplicit in statements about pay for
different occupations are statements about
differentials in pay. For instance, someone
who reports that the chairman of a large
national company earns or should earn X
while a bricklayer earns or should earn Y is
telling us about the differentials he per-
ceives to exist or believes should exist. The
legacy hypothesis suggests that persons in
ex-communist countries should differ from
those in capitalist countries both in the
occupational differentials they perceive to
exist and in the differentials they believe to
be fair (that is, the differentials ihey believe
"ought to" exist).
Table 1 gives the standard deviations of
tbe tiatttral log of earnitigs from the 1987
and 1992 ISSP modules.'" In 1987, workers
in the two ex-communist couti tries for which
we have data, Hungary and Poland, per-
ceived smaller occupational differentials
than did workers in most Western coun-
tries. The unweighted country tnean for
Hungary and Poland in the standard devia-
tion of perceived differentials is, for ex-
ample, 0.57, which falls cotisiderably short
of the 0.81 for workers in the West and the
'"We also calculated the standard deviation of the
logoi waives or (where wages were unavailable) earn-
ings in r(-'portin(f countries from the 1987 and 1992
iSSP suneys. The only ex-communist country' lor
which earnings data exist for 1987 is Hungary: its
measure of inequality is below that of all the capitalist
countries except West Germany. For the year 1992,
we have data on all of the ex-communist countries in
our sample. In the ex-communist sample, Hungary
ttirns out to be among the low inequality countries,
while Russia, Slovenia, and Poland have higher stan-
dard deviations of log earnings. Among the capitalist
countries, Norway and Italy join (iermany as low
ineqttality cotintries. Overall, incqtiality was still
higher in 1992 in the ex-communist countries.
0.85 for those in the four large ex-commu-
nist countries for which we have data in
both 1987 and 1992 (the United States,
West Germany, Great Britain, and Italy).
The second column in the table shows a
similar ex-communist/Western difference
in the pattern of occtipational pay differen-
tials that people believe ought to exist:
persons in the ex-communist states favor
smaller differentials than persons in the
West. In the 1987 data, the average stan-
dard deviatioti of the natural log of earu-
ings perceived to be fair is 0.40 for Hungary
and Poland, compared lo an average of
0.60 in the capitalist countries.
By contrast, in 1992, when the transition
to a market economy was under way, per-
sons in Hiuigary atid Poland and in the
other ex-communist countries for which we
have data reported very different percep-
tions of pay differentials. The differentials
they perceived were wider than those per-
ceived by respondents in the Western coun-
tries in the ISSP (which includes Norway,
with an extremely narrow wage distribu-
tion) and similar to those perceived by
workers in the big ex-communist countries.
Similarly, what Hungarians and Poles be-
lieved "ought to" be paid to workers in
different occupations was much greater in
1992 than in 1987. Because the "ought to"
differentials are also high for workers in
the other ex-communist countries, the
unweighted mean of the standard devia-
tion of the natural log of earnings per-
ceived to be fair is in the same range for
employees in the ex-communist coutiiries
as for those in the West; it is slightly higher
than the unweighted mean for all Western
countries (inclusive of Norway) and slightly
lower than the meati for the larger ex-
communist countries.
In botb years, and in all countries, ex-
communist and capitalist, there seems to
be a relation between the distribution of
perceived pay and the distribution of pay
perceived to be fair. The "ottght to" differ-
entials are invariably stnaller than the per-
ceived differentials, suggesting that work-
ers may form their views of the appropriate
pay by occupation on the basis of perceived
pay, scaling the latter down hy some amount.
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Table I. Perceptions of Actual Earnings and Fair Earnings Across 11 Occupations: Responses
of Tbose Surveyed in Six Ex-Communist and Eleven Capitalist Countries, 1987 and 1992.
(Mean Standard Deviation of Log Earnings)
Covntty
1987
Perceived
Earnings
1987
Earnings Vieuvd
as Fair
1992
Perceived
Earnings
1992
Eamingx Viewed
ai Fair
Cx-Cotnmunist
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
East (Germany
Hungary
Poland '
Russia
Unweighted Mean
Capitalisi
Australia
Austria
Canada
(Jreal Britain
halv
Ni'iht-rlands
New Zealand
Norway
Switzerland
Uniicd States
West GiTiiiany
Unweighted Mean
BIG 07 (US, we;. GB, It)
59
54
57
55
95
S4
74
85
88
84
81
85
.41
.38
.40
.43
.64
.61
.59
.65
.68
.60
.60
.63
.77
1.35
l.OS
.94
1.02
1.09
1.03
.84
.8)
.99
.91
.81
.59
1.19
1.05
.90
1.04
.53
1.07
.78
.67
.68
.71
.74
.69
.63
.76
.77
,61
.37
.83
.79
.68
.79
.Sottrce: ISSP (1987, 1992). Calntlaled from data shown in Appendix Tables Al and A2.
Kor a list of the occupations covered, see tcxi.
Perceived differentials increase between
1987 aiul 1992, and so too do "ought to"
diflercritials. Couiitrifswith high perceived
{iilTcreniials have high "ought to" differen-
tials.
To explore the relation between "ought
to" and perceived occupational pay, we cal-
culated individual-specific measures of per-
ceived aud "ought to" occupational earn-
ing.s differeutlais. Specifically, for each
prr.sou in the .samples, we calculated the
standard deviation of that respondent's
perception of actual earnings across occu-
pations and the standard deviation of the
earning.s he or she believes "ought to" be
paid across those occupations. These sta-
tistics differ from the statistics in Table 1.
In Table 1 we calculated .standard devia-
tions for the natural log of mean earnings
across occupations within a country (one
value per country). Our new statistic is
based on the standard deviation of tbe natu-
ral log of earnings across occupations re-
ported by each individual (one value for
each individual).
We then estimated ordinary least squares
regressions of these individual measures of
perceived and de.sired inequality on per-
sonal characteristics, such as schtjoling, age,
geuder, andcoiintry dummy variables, witb
the United States as tbe reference group.
By including variables for individual char-
acteristics, we perform ceteris parihus com-
parisons of people in the ex-<:ommunist
countries and in tbe West and examine the
relation between personal characteristics
and perceived/"ought to" pay differentials.
Since the group of countries covered in
1987 differs from that covered in 1992, we
provide separate calculations for the two
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years. To summarize the ex-communist
countries/Western countries differentials
of concern, we also estimated a restricted
model in which we replaced tbe individual
country dummies with the single summary
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
an ex-communist country and 0 for the
Western coiuitries. Finally, to test infer-
ences about changes over time, we further
estimated our model on a pooled sample
limited to countries that appear in both
years.
Table 2 presents the basic cross-section
regression results. There are three find-
ings. First, consistent with Table l,cohmin
1 of Table 2 shows that, controlling for
pcr.sonal characteristics, in 1987 persons in
ex-conuiuniist countries peiceived lower
occupational pay differentials than did re-
spondents in the West, save for those in
Australia. C.olunui 2 shows that the Htni-
gariaus and Poles also believed that the
differentials "ought to" be less tban did
respondents in the West, including the
Australians. The coefficients on school-
ing Iiniher show ihat persons wiih more
poieutial earnings power also perceived
greater differentials and were more likely
to believe that sucb differentials were
fair.
Column 3 adds the standard deviation of
the natinal log of perceived diffcrt-tuials to
the "ought to" equation. What does this tell
us? It shows what people in different coun-
tries believt' the spread in occupational pay
sbould be, rcmditional on the spread they
perceive. For instance, the coefficient on
the dummy for Hungary' of-.0574 shows
that, takingaccount of the lower perceived
sprea<l in earnings, Hungarians still de-
sired a smaller spread tban did persons in
tbe excluded United States.
The coefficients on tbe standard devia-
tion of perceived earnings are overwhelm-
ingly statistically significanl. This implies
that people's altitudes toward the spread ()f
earnings that "ough t to" be paid are formed
not in A vacuum but in fact depend upon
what they sec in the marketplace. The 0.62
coefficient implies, roughly, that individu-
als believe the distribtitiou of occupational
differentials in tbeir country "ought to" be
scaled down from wbat they perceive it to
be by a factor of 0.62.
For example, if the standard deviation of
the natural log of perceived occupational
earnings was 0.64 (the mean value in our
sample in 1992), the estimated coefficient
implies, ciHeris paribus, individuals would
like earnings differentials tbat would yield
a standard deviation of 0.57 {the standard
deviation of perceived pay of 0.92 nuilti-
plied by 0.62). Conditional on perceived
differentials, persons in Hungary and Po-
land favored a modestly more egalitarian
distribution thau tbose in Western coun-
tries: tbeex-communistdumtny variable in
the restricted regression isJust-.O2, though
highly significant.
Columns 3-6 of the table confirm tbe
more complicated pattern for 1992. Per-
ceived differentials vary considerably, with
dummies for the ex-communist countries
showing that workers in most countries
perceived less inequality than did persons
in the United States (tbe big exception
being Russia), but more tban in Norway.
The summary measure shows that tbe ex-
comnnniist dummy is a positive .10, due in
large part to the low perceived inequality in
Norway among the western countries. The
regression f(»r the spread in earnings that
"<niglu to" be paid \n column "> shows a
similar pattern. Iiui in this case workers in
all tbe ex-communist countries, including
Russia, have lower "ought to" differentials
than in the United States. The coefficient
on tbe dummy variable for ex-communist
countries in the summary regression is
0.0277.
This finding might lead some to believe
that people in tbe ex-communist countries
have less desire for narrowing pay differen-
tials than do people in the West. But our
hypothesis is that egalitarian desires are
tempered by perceived market differen-
tials. Tbus tbe appropriate equation to
assess tlie desires is equation (6). Here the
dummy variables for the ex-communist
covmtries are smaller than those in all West-
ern countries except Norway, and tbe
dummy variable in the summary regression
is -0.029, with a t-stalistic of 8.19. The
similarity to the 1987 coefficient is impres-
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sive, suggesting that lhe column (3) and
(6) results represent a more stable pattern
than the column (2) and (5) results.
How do the findings square with those
reported earlier based on the broader ques-
tion of the percentages who agree strongly
that differences in uicome are too large? If
the responses to the occupational earnings
questions and tbe responses to the "Are
difKerences in income loo large?" question
are capturing the same attitudes, we would
expect that including the responses to the
latter in the equations for tbe spread of
"ought to" pay should greatly weaken tbe
dummy variables for tbe ex-communist
countries. Column 7 shows thai this is
indeed the case. The coefficients on virtu-
ally all of the country dummy variables
decline, and the summary measure for ex-
communist states drops to a bare -0.0055,
which is not significantly different from
zero. Tbe underlying reason for tbe nega-
tive ct)efficient in column (6) is thus the
broad desires for lower income differences.
Overall, the implication of Table 2 is that
individuals in the ex-communist countries
more strongly desired a narrowing of pay
differentials than did those in the West, but
that they substantially tempered that desire
in the light of rising differentials during
tbe transition to a market economy. The
data on which the regressions reported in
Table 2 are based, however, differ across
the two years both in tbe mix of countries
included and in the set of occupations for
which earnings were reported. To make a
firmer assessment of changes over lime,
and guarantee that any measured changes
over time are not due to chatiges in the
composition of our samples, we formed a
pooled sample of observations for individu-
als in the ex-communist cotintries and for
those in the Western countries that reported
hi both years. This sample, which contains
just two ex-communist countries. Hungary
and Poland, and just four Western coun-
tries, the United States, Great Britain, Aus-
tralia, and West Germany, provides a rela-
tively clean picture of changes over time.
To capture the changes, we include dummy
variables for interactions between country
and year. Tbe dummy variable for 1992 is
included to capture actual changes across
the years as well as differences in tbe samples
of occupations between tbe two years.
Tabie 3 gives oiu' pooled regression re-
sults. The dummy variables for Hungary
and Poland in column 1 show that in 1987
perceived differentials were lower in those
two countries than in the West. The 1992
country interaction terms show tbat tbe
differentials rose by about 0.20 natural log
points over tbe five-year period. The re-
gression coefficients for the 1992 interac-
tions also show rises in perceived differen-
tials in Western countries, but by smaller
magnitudes. To obtain ihe perceived dif-
ferentials in 1992, we must sum the coeffi-
cients on country and countr\-year interac-
tions. The rosultsof that analysis show that
perceived differentials in Hungary and
Poland differed little from those in Great
Britain and Germany, were smaller than in
the United States, and were larger than in
Australia.
The spread of "ought to" differentials in
column 2 reveals a general upward trend in
the differentials respondents believe "ougbt
to" be paid: the 1992 interaction terms are
positive. The upward trend is weaker in
HungaiT but not in Poland than in the
Western countries: the coefficients on the
country-year dummy variable of .0473 for
Hungary suggest a smaller perceived in-
crease than in the United States (the 1992
dummy of .0869 reflects the United States)
or in the other Western countries, whereas
for Poland, the .0997 coefficient is compa-
rable to that for the United States and
larger than those for other Western coun-
tries.
The bottom line calculations are in Table
3, where we estimate tbe coefficients on
country dummy variables, conditional on
the spread in perceived differentials. In
1987 people in both Poland and Hungary
had a lower spread in "ought to" differen-
tials than tbose in the United States or
Australia. But their spread is similar to that
among people in Great Britain and Ger-
many. The sum of the coefficients on the
country terms and the country-year interac-
tion terms for 1992 shows that the spread in
pay across occupations that was believed to
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Table S. Perceptions of Actual Earnings and Fair Earnings in Five Countries:
Pooled Regressions, 1987 and 1992.
(t-Statistics in Parentheses)
VariabUt/Country
Perceived
Earnings
a)
Earnings Viewed
as fair
(2)
Viewed
Fair
SD Perceived Earnings
Years of Schooling
Hiingar\-
Australia
Great Britain
West Germany
1992 Dummy
Hungary*1992
Poland*l9y2
Australia«1992
Great Britain*I992
West Germany* 1992
DF
N
Root MSE
—
.0068
(9,02)
-.2556
(30.89)
-.2973
(32.73)
-.2992
(32.25)
-.0835
(9.03)
-.0765
(8.36)
.1466
(14.99)
.2115
(15.51)
.1922
(13.97)
.0688
(5.42)
.0571
(4.07)
.0579
(4.50)
.3761
13960
13979
.2151
—
.0101
(12.49)
-.2156
(26.31)
-.2380
(26,60)
-.2019
(21.86)
-.0924
(9.76)
-.0778
(8.42)
.0869
(9.13)
.0473
(3.65)
.0997
{7.57)
.0210
(1.66)
.0506
(3.60)
.0517
(4.07)
.2.'il4
14628
14647
.2218
.5992(86.28)
.0057
(9.92)
-.0592
(8.43)
-.0530
(6.85)
-.0225
(2.93)
-.0431
(5.65)
-.0432
(5.73)
-.(J248
(3.02)
-.0547
(4.83)
.0011
(0.09)
.0004
(0.04)
.0379
(3.29)
.0533
(5.01)
.5077
1S324
13343
.172S
Notes: Equations also include five age dummies aud a gender dummy. The excluded category is the United
Slates. Bfcausf the schooling variable was missing for Poland, in all cases for that country we imputed the mean
for the other countries.
Source: ISSP (1987, 1992).
lie "fair" was smaller for Hungarians and
Poles than for Americans or other Western-
ers, conditional on the perceived spread.
We concltide that respondents in the ex-
communist countries had a greater prefer-
ence for narrowing occupational earnings,
conditional on perceived earnings, than
did Westerners, but that the difference in
preferencesdiminished greatly as perceived
differentials widened in those countries
more rapidly than they did in most Western
countries.
Job Satisfaction, Happiness
and the Role of Trade Unions
Because Htingary has been in the ISSP
since 1986, we have available nmre infor-
mation on outcomes and attittides for that
country than for the other ex-communist
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countries. The 1989 ISSP asked questions
abotujob satisfaction and working condi-
tions. Tbe 1990 ISSP asked questions about
unionism. Although we are leery about
generalizing from a single country to all ex-
communist countries, tfie differences in
attitudes between Hungarian employees
and those in Western countries do provide
insight into the potential legacy of commu-
liisni. They allow ns to examine tbe widely
held view ibat communist labor relations
practices produced less desirable workplace
conditions and less satisfied workers tban
free market practices. (See Haraszti 1978;
for a contrasting view, bowever, see Burawoy
and Lukacs 1992.)
Respondents to the 1989 ISSP were asked
the generic (and widely used) job satisfac-
tion quesiion. "How satisfied are you in
yotirjob?" Questions abotujob satisfaction
are difficult tt) interpret due to the subjec-
tive nature ofthe variable and problems in
making interpersonal comparisons (Free-
man 1978). Still, econometric analyses
based on satisfaction data have yielded in-
teresting and consistent results across data
sets that sbow links between satisfaction
and economic and demographic variables,
and also show tbatjob satisfaction is a good
predictor of future quit bebavior—indeed,
in many longitudinal surveys, tbe best sucb
predictor {see, for example, Hamermesh
1977; Borjas 1979; Freeman 1978;
BianchHower and Oswald 1992; and Clark
and Oswald 1997).
What is more troubling for our analysis is
tbat people in one country may "scale"
responses differently from those in another
{see Hofstede 1985 for studies of different
countt-y responses to satisfaction-type ques-
tions in a single multinational). For in-
stance, Americans may be relatively opti-
mistic, with an "everything will work out"
mentality that leads them to respond more
positively than a comparable British group
lo the question "Are you satisfied with your
job?" even though their true satisfaction,
on some objective scale," is the same as tbat
"One objective scaling would be to delermine
how salisfaciion rt-spaiises map inici labor tiirnnvcr.
of tbe {possibly more reserved) British. We
deal with tliis problem by examining an-
swers to more objective questions regard-
ing workplace conditions—such as bealth
and safety conditions—and estimating an
ordered probii model in wbich we include
as controls responses to otber unrelated
questions that might index national pat-
terns of response.
In any case, relatively few Hungarians
reported being very satisfied or completely
satisfied {13%) with their jobs compared to
Westerners, among whom tbe proportion
ranged from 3.S% in Eire to 50% in tbe
United States.'^ At face value, tbis confirms
the notion that workersundercimimiinism
are less satisfied tban workers under capi-
talism.
Table 4 presents evidence on worker
perceptions of objective workplace condi-
tions tbat might explain the low job satis-
faction reported by Hungarian workers. It
shows that Hungarian workers are far less
likely to regard their jobs as interesting
than are Western workers {question 1) and
far more likely to see their workplace as
involving dangerous conditions {question
2) and unhealthy conditions {question 3).
All of tbese perceptions are likely to feed
into lowjob satisfaction. To the extent that
they reflect objective conditions, they sug-
gest tbat the reported lower job satisfaction
has some groiniding in reality.
As our final check on the effect of com-
munist labor relations on job satisfaction,
we use the entire distribution of responses
on tbe 1989 job satisfaction question to
estimate the difference in job satisfaction
between Hungarian workers and Western
Satisfaction correlates well with quit behavior, so if
the same response It-d to similar quitting acio.'iKtoiin-
trifs, we could view rt'sponst's as valid indicators of
one loriii ot objective behavior. However, we do not
have data contra.siiiig saiislactioii and quits atioss
(oiintries.
'•The proportiunsof workers who reported being
"very'or "cotnpletelv" satisfied with their jobs were as
follows: Hungary. 13%; Ireland. 33%; Italy. 34%:
Israel, .37%; Great Britain. 39%; Netherlands. 39%;
Norway. 43%; West Germany, 44%; Austria, 48%; and
the Llnited States, 50%.
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Table 4. Employees' Perceptions of
Their Wctrk and Working Conditions, 1989:
Respondents in Hungary Compared
to Those in Eleven Capitalist Countries."
Unwrighlrd
Mean of
Response.^ in
Capitalist
Response Hungary Countrins
(Ql) "My job is interesting" -
Employed Respondeats Only (1989: V63)
Strongly Agree 6.6 25.7
Agrt-e 60.4 49.5
Neither 20.4 1.^ .3
I)isat,'ree 10.8 6.7
Sirongly Disagree 1.5 2.8
N 603 6296
(Q2) "How often do you work in
dangerous conditions?" - Employed
Respondents Only (1989: V72)
Always 15.8 3.6
Olten 13.0 6.4
Sonn-times 16.3 17.7
Hardly Ever 10.8 18.7
Never 44.2 53.9
N 602 6273
I
<Q3l "How oflen do you work in
unhealthy conditions?" - Employed
Respondents Only (1989: V73)
Always 10.3 3.8
Often , 9.8 6.4
Somt-times 17.6 18.4
HHr<lly Ever 12.4 19.5
Never 49.9 51.8
N 602 6206
•For a list of countries, sec Table 1 or text.
SnurcK ISSP (1989).
workers in an ordered probit model. Or-
dered probits are the appropriate statisti-
cal procedure where, as in this case, re-
spondents express their preferences in the
form of an ordinal ranking.
Otninodel inrludosvarioii.s demographic
variables that arc known to influence job
satisfaction, including gender, age, and
marital status. We also incltide a tinionism
variable, wh ich previous studies have found
is negatively correlated with satisfaction
(Freeman 1978; Borjas 1979), and self-em-
ployment, which has been found to be posi-
tively related to satisfaction (Blanchflower
and Oswald 199S). In this analysis, the
coefficient on this dummy variable tells us
how the entire distribution of job satisfac-
tion differs between Hungarians and West-
erners, conditional on the diverse control
variables.
Table 5 presents our results. Column 1
gives a basic job satisfaction equation. It
shows that the "control variables" have their
expected effects on Job satisfaction. Thus,
the ISSP question on job satisfaction gives
results comparable to those in other sur-
veys: unionism, in particular, is negatively
related to job satisfaction, while self-em-
ployment is positively related. The coeffi-
cient on the Hungary dummy is large, nega-
tive, and statistically significant (-.53).
Column 2 controls, as best we can, for
income, on the hypothesis that Hungarians
may be less satisfied with their job not be-
cause of any legacy of communist labor
relations but simply because they are lower
paid than Western workers. For this ptir-
pose. wf use an ISSP question that asked
people whether they viewed their income
as high: "For each of the following state-
ments about yourjob, please tick one box
to show how mucli you agree or disagree
that it applies to yourjob: My income is
high."
Consistent with lower income in former
communist countries, Hungarians were far
more likely than Western workers to dis-
agree with this statement. Some 70% of
Hungarians disagreed or disagreed strongly
that their income was high, compared to
48% ofthe Biitish, 27% of Germans, 33%
of Italians, 43% of Americans, and compa-
rable fractions of other Westerners. Work-
ers who report that their income is low are
less likely to be satisfied (that is, the coeffi-
cients on the various categorical responses
are increasingly negative compared to the
omitted group of persons who strongly agree
that their income is high). Tbe coefficient
on tbe Hungary dummy falls to -.41 upon
addition ofthe "income is high" responses,
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Tahle 5. Correlates of Job Satisfaction, 1989:
Ordered Probits.
(2) (3)
Variable
Standard Standard Standard
Coefficient Error Coefficient Error Coeffinent Error
Dummy
-.531.'! .0471
-.4149 .0479 -.3211
Male
Married
Agf
Yf;ir.s of Srhooling
Union Stutits
"My income is high ""
Agree
Neither Agree Nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Can't Choose
'My job is interesting'^
Agree
Neither Agree Nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
Can't Choose
'Dtmgerotis conditions'
Oflen
Sometimes
Hardly Ever
Never
'Vnhratthy conditions'^
Often
Sometimes
Hardly Ever
Never
Threshold 1
Thre.shold 2
Tlireshuld S
Thicshold 4
Threshold f>
Threshold 6
Number of Observations
Chi-(7)
Pseiido R-
Log Likelihood
.0500
-.1207
.3242
.0207
.0100
.0002
-.0958
-2.2709
-1.9239
-1.3500
-.7704
.5209
1.4285
6399
307.40
0.0170
8907.4.-122
.0271
.0468
.029R
.0011
.0044
,0279
.0911
.0818
.0759
.0741
.0739
.0751
-.2015
.3249
.0011
.0091
-.0089
-.1030
-.2247
-.5683
-.8630
-1.2801
-.4569
-3.2536
-2.8934
-2.2885
-1.6779
-.3192
.6355
684(i
844.94
0.0471
-8555.3416
.0277
.0476
.0302
.0012
.0045
.02« 1
.0813
.0791
.0792
.0872
.1541
.1238
. 11 ti5
.1117
1100
.1089
.1091
-.1271
.2334
-.0190
.OOGfi
-.0356
-.0708
-.149.'!
-.3626
-.5869
-.9870
-. 17.10
-..'.806
-1.2294
-1.5457
-2.1059
-1.0886
-.1899
-.0442
-.1519
-.1096
.0647
.1185
.2159
.4109
-4.2908
-3.8.=i75
-3.1390
-2.4:^10
-.8877
.1621
6312
2133.24
.1194
-7866.71
.0296
.0487
.0308
.0012
.0047
.0288
.0832
.0814
.0917
.0895
.1730
.O3.'i3
.04H2
.0621
.0978
.2808
.0848
.0764
.0777
.0752
.0868
.0775
.0786
.0756
.1553
. 1469
.1411
. 1391
. 1373
.1370
Note: The sample consists of employed respondents only.
Source: iSSP (1989).
'The excluded category is "strongly agree."
The excluded category is "always."
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bul it remains substantial and significant.
Al similar perceptions of income (if not
similar incomes), Hungarians are less satis-
fied with their jobs than Westerners. Fi-
nally, column S includes a series of dummy
variables to distiugui.sb whether respon-
dents considered their jobs to be "interest-
ing" or their working conditions to be "un-
healthy" or "dangerous" (as in Table 4).
The inclusion of these variables reduces
the size ofthe coefficient on the Hungary
dummy by approximately a quarter, al-
though ihe coefficient remains statistically
significant. These factors contribute to the
low levels of saiisfaction in Hungary, but
they are not the whole story. All told, we
interpret ibe ordered probits as confirm-
ing the reported lower job satisfaction of
Hungarians with evidence about objective
features of workplaces.
In addition to evidence on job satisfac-
tion, we have reports of overall happiness
by respondents, whether employed, unem-
ployed, or out of tbe labor force. Since
work is such an important part of life, we
expect that this measure of attitudes ought
also to be related to labor market experi-
ences. Our "happiness" measure also has
one important advantage over job satisfac-
tion: it covers all citizens, including the
jobless. The 1991 ISSP provides data on
perceived "happiness" for Slovenia, Poland,
and Easi Germany, as well as for Hungary
and Western countries. Respondents were
asked; "If you were to consider your life in
general these days, bow happy or luihappy
would you say you are, on the whole?" Four
options were given for tbeir replies—"not
at all," "not very," "fairly," and "very."'^
Thirty-eight percent of Hungarians, 23%
of East Germans, and 45% of Slovenes said
'^ Overall, the responses wert- as follows (%):
Noi Not No.
at All Very Fairly Very Obs.
they were not at all happy or not very happy,
compared to 11 % of West Germans, 8% of
the British, 8% of Americans, 7% of the
Irish, 10% of New Zealanders. and 11 % of
Norwegians. Only the Italians and Israelis
had "not at all" or "not ver)'" happy percent-
ages close to those of the eastern Europe-
ans—22% for Italians and Israelis.
Table 6 reports a series of ordered probit
equations to estimate country effects on
happiness, controlling for age, gender,
marital status, andyears of schooling. Once
again we report results including a full set
otcounti7 dummies (the excluded country
is the United Slates) as well as the results
from an equation that replaces the country
dummies with a single ex-communist
dummy. Individuals in the ex-communist
countries reported being less happy than
those in the Western countries in our
sample. As can be seen from column 1, the
lowest levels of bappiness among tbe West-
ern countries were lo be found in Israel and
Italy. The young, married individuals,
women, and those with higher levels of
schooling reported the highest levels of
happiness.
In order to obtain results comparable to
the job satisfaction evidence presented
above, which was for workers only, in col-
umns 2 and 3 we restrict the samples to the
employed and those unemployed or out of
the labor force, respectively. The pattern
of results, including the country dummy
structure, is remarkably similar to the job
satisfaction pattern. In column 4, where
two dummies are added to control for labor
market status, we confirm the earlier find-
ing of Oswald (1994) that the unemployed
are less happy than the employed (the ex-
cluded category). This negative unemploy-
ment resuh is further confirmed in col-
umns 5 and 6 of Table 6, where we report
separate estimates for the 11 capitalist coun-
tries and the 4 ex-communist countries.''*
The main differences between these two
equations are the lack of significance ofthe
All
Capitalist
Ex-Communist
3
2
5
15
9
30
fiO
62
56
22
27
y
17967
12832
5135 '*The excluded countries are the United Slatesand Hungary, respectively.
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Table 6. Reported Happiness in Capilalisl and Ex-Communist Countries, 1991: Ordered Probits.
Va rin bU/Cou n try
Ma It-
Age 25-34
Age 3r>-44
Age 4.'j-54
Age 55-64
Age 65-74
Married
Widowed
Divorced/Separated
Years of Schooling
Wesi Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Netherlands
Italy
Eire
Northern Ireland
Poland
Slovenia
IMiilippiiK-s
New Zealand
Norway
Israel
East Germany
All
(I)
-.0933
(5.14)
-.1901
(5.58)
-.2742
(7.56)
-.2727
(7.09)
-.2738
(6.86)
-.1158
(2.63)
.3659
(13.24)
-.2261
(4.75)
-.2604
(5.88)
.0253
(8.4«)
-.3661
(7.74)
-.1231
(2.55)
-1.0946
(21.54)
-.2018
(4.47)
-.8122
(15.86)
.0863
(1.70)
-.0090
(0.17)
-.9233
(17.72)
-1.2245
(27.63)
-.4325
(8.74)
-.2824
(5.63)
-.4417
(9.40)
-.«I90
(15.83)
-.8258
(17.81)
Employed
(2)
-.0980
(4.09)
-.1748
(4.02)
-.2888
(6.32)
-.2930
(6.01)
-.2823
(4.80)
.1.367
(1.19)
.3532
(10.22)
-.1457
(1.77)
-.2208
(3.8ff)
.0215
(5.51)
-.3574
(.5.89)
-.1412
(2.15)
-1.0500
(16.43)
-.2147
(3.44)
-.8222
(12.46)
.1638
(2.42)
.1081
(1.47)
-.8681
(12.85)
-1.2372
(21.79)
-.4144
(6.58)
-.2678
(4.24)
-.4662
(7.87)
-.6870
(10.36)
-.8425
(14.45)
Not
Empluytd
(3)
-.1418
(4.66)
-.2785
(4.85)
-.3113
(4.91)
-.2774
(4.27)
-.2277
(3.82)
-.0869
(1.43)
.3816
(8.14)
-.2440
(3.77)
-.3068
(4.31)
.0270
(5.53)
-.3819
(5.00)
-.1031
(1.40)
-1.2126
(I-!. 19)
-.1755
(2,55)
-.8047
(9.78)
.0149
(0.19)
-.1142
(1.38)
-.9875
(11.89)
-1.2220
(16.89)
-.4701
(5.81)
-.2986
(3.58)
-.39.58
(5.0S)
-.9931
(11.87)
-.8258
(10.62)
AU
(f)
-.0960
(5.11)
-.2068
(6.04)
-.3003
(8.22)
-.3037
(7.85)
-.2994
(7.39)
-.1373
(3.00)
.3547
(12.81)
-.2385
(5.00)
-.2584
(5.83)
.0229
(7.63)
-..3748
(7.92)
-.0980
(2.03)
-1.1122
(21.85)
-.1961
(4.31)
-.8143
(15.89)
.1165
(2.28)
.0111
(0.21)
-.9003
(17.25)
-1.2226
(27.56)
-.4343
(8.77)
-.2856
(5.65)
-.4459
(9.48)
-.7888
(15.21)
-.8114
(17.46)
Capitalist
-.1232
(5.37)
-.2025
(5.10)
-.2844
(6.64)
-.2898
(6.34)
-.2921
(6.06)
-.0839
(1.59)
.3670
(11.35)
-.2129
(3.71)
-.2548
(4.84)
.0175
(4.91)
-.3904
(8.17)
-.1055
(2.19)
n/a
-.2006
(4.38)
-.8234
(15.88)
.1127
(2.18)
.0025
(0.05)
n / a
n / a
-.4492
(8.92)
-.2884
(5.71)
-.4537
(9.57)
-.7774
(14.85)
n / a
Ex-
Cammunist
(6)
-.0403
(1.22)
-.2181
(3.18)
-.3406
(4.79)
-.3376
(4..'J5)
-.3087
(3.89)
-.2994
(3.16)
.3004
(5.48)
-.3299
(3.77)
-.3133
(3.73)
.0377
(6.70)
n / a
n / a
n / a
n / a
n / a
n / a
.1752
(.3.23)
-.1301
(2.85)
n/a
n/a
n / a
n / a
.2898
(6.00)
Continued
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Table 6. Continued
Variable/Cou nlry
Nut Ex-
All Employed Employnl AU Capitalist Communist
(1) (2) (3) (4) 0) 16)
Unemployed
Oui ol' lhe Labor Korce
Threshold 1
Threshold 2
Threshold 3
Chi-
N
Pseudo R''
Separate Equations
Ex-Comnuiiiist Dummy
—
-2.4193
-1.2745
.6072
2780
16529
.0820
-.8439(28.58)
—
-2.5888
-1.3891
.57.58
1503
9733
.0787
-.7082(26.88)
—
—
-2.3017
-1.1936
.5845
1325
6796
.0901
-.7322(22.36)
-.4549
(11.24)
-.0424
(1.86)
-2.5224
-1.3687
.5221
2907
16529
.08.58
-.8348(28.23)
-.4995
(9.89)
-.0452
(1.70)
-2.4040
-1.4735
.4700
I no
11655
.0502
n / a
-.3583
(5.27)
-.0360
(0.75)
-1.4934
-.1064
1.6800
402
4874
.0393
n/a
the Unittd St;itts is the excluded category in (;olumn.s 1-5. Hungary is excluded in column 6.
Source: ISSP (U)91).
gender variable in eqttation 6and the higher
levels o( happiness of those age 6;J-74 in
cqtiation 5contpared with the middle-aged.
Individtials Uving in cx-cointttttnist couti-
tries report lower levels of happiness and, if
employed, lower levels oi job satisfaction
than are found in otir control grotip of
Western couniries. Tbis is further confir-
tnation of the legacy hypothesis.
Attitudes Toward Unions
One interpretation oi" the restths on job
satisfaction is that it is a legacy of transmis-
sion belt unions and the absence of a free
labor market. If the lack of independent
voice is, in fact, an impuiiatit factor, we
wottid expect to see Hungarians and per-
sons in otbet ex-commutiist cotnitrics dif-
fer from people in Western cotnitries in
ihcir attitudes toward trade iniiotis.
The 1990 and 1993 ISSP contains several
questions about attitudes toward unionism
that enable us to test tbat interpretation.
Table 7 records the responses of Hungar-
ians, Hulgarians. and Czechs as well as ISSP
respondents from Western countries to
qtiestions regarding unionism in those sur-
veys. The responses to the qttestion "How
good are trade/labor titiiods for the coun-
uy as a whole?" show tbal persons in the ex-
communist countries bad less favorable
views of union.s in their country than did
Westerners. Forty-two percent of Hungar-
ians, 45% of Bulgarians, and 37% of Czechs
reported that unions were "not very good"
or "not good at all," cotnpared to 16% of
West Germans, 27% ofthe British respon-
dents, 25% of American respondents, and
so on.
A large number of Italians (44%) also
reported that unions were "not very good"
or "not good at all." But the reason for
the dissatisfaction witb ttnions in ex-com-
munist cottntries differs markedly from
the reason for Italian dissatisfaction.
Asked "Do you think that trade unions
bave too mucb poweror too little power?",
the easterti Europeans overwhelmingly
thought that unions had loo little power,
whereas Italians disapproved of unions
as having too mtich power (responses to
questioti 2). Moreover, the proportion
of Htmgarians who expressed the belief
tbat strong trade unions are needed to
protect workers (question 3) exceeded
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Tnhh 7. Pcrccptitms of lhe Role of Trade Unions in Nine Couniries, 1990 and
(QI) "How good are trade/labor unions for the country as a whole?"
(1990: V45 and 1993 preliminary for Bulgaria & Czech Republic)
Unweighted Means
Hirsptinse
Excelicni
Very Good
Fairly Goiid
Niil Very Good
Nni Good at All
N
Hungary Bulgaria
1990
2.7
30.4
25.1
26.fi
15.2
782
1993
10.1
21.4
23.1
21.2
24.2
822
Czfch
liepublif
1993
4.0
15.6
57.6
18.8
3.9
865
Ex-
Commumst
1990*1993
5.6
22.5
35.3
22.2
1 4 4
2469
Capitalist
1990
3.3
17.3
r>3.5
19.9
fi,0
7189
West
Germany
1990
5.7
26.0
53.3
13.2
1.8
2303
Gli
1990
2.0
15.7
55.3
20.7
6,2
971
USA
1990
2.9
17.2
54.3
19.7
b.l
943
Norway
1990
3.7
21 9
58.6
12.2
3 6
1271
hrael
1990
3.3
15.2
5.3.1
21.3
7.1
7.^ 0
Italy
1990
1.9
7 9
-16.5
32.4
11.3
951
(Q2) "Do you think that trade/labor unions in this country have too mucb power?"
(1990: V42 and 1993 preliminary Tor Bulgaria 8e Czech Republic)
Unweighted Means
Response
Far Too Much
Power
Too Much Power
Aboui Right
Too I.iitle Power
Far Too LitUe
Power
N
(QS)"
Rtsponse
Strongly Agree
.ARiee
Neither
Disagree
Strongly Disagree
N
Hungary liulgnria
1990'
5.8
12.4
18.3
33.7
29.8
782
1993
5,1
19.9
20.7
32.6
21.7
792
'Workers need
Hun^try
28.8
47.4
12.0
10.0
1.8
880
Czech Ex-
Ittfpuhlir Communist (
1993 1990*1993
\A
6.8
26.7
50.2
14.8
849
4.1
13.0
21.9
38.8
22.1
2423
Capitalist
1990
13.4
25.4
44,0
14.3
2.8
7195
West
Germany GB
1990
8.4
19.5
57.9
12,3
1.8
2303
1990
9.1
26.8
49.3
13.0
1.7
971
USA
1990
14.7
32.0
39.3
11.5
2.4
943
Strong trade unions to protect their interests"
Ceipilali.U
Unweighted
Mean
21.3
39.8
18.8
15.0
5.1
18273
West
Grrman^
31.5
41.7
15.4
9.1
2.3
1288
( GB
12.1
29,6
23.2
28.8
6.3
1085
USA
10.6
2.5.5
26.2
25.4
12.3
1231
Austria
24.4
49.0
11.0
12.2
3.3
1631
Norway
23.7
41.2
19.2
U.I
4.8
16,=»2
NoTwirf
1990
12,3
24.9
52,2
9,5
t.l
1269
(1989:
Nfther-
tands
17.7
48.2
22,5
9.1
2.6
1487
Israel
1990
7.8
30,4
33.2
25.3
3.2
779
V23)
Israel
24,2
42.8
16.2
12.2
4.7
1003
Italy
1990
28.2
18.9
32,2
14.3
6.4
930
Italy
26.6
39.0
17.0
13.0
4.3
946
S,,urr>-: ISSP (1990. 1993),
that in all Western countries except Ger-
many.'''
'"'We initially expected one additional ISSP ques-
linii—"In gent-ral. how would you describe relations
at your workplace between nianaHfrncnt and employ-
ees?"—to bf intoi niaiive on possible aiiiiiidt-.s toward
ihf i ieed lor unions. But ihe responst-olMiingarians
relative to Westerrier.>i here was ambigiions, .A much
smaller proport ion (11.5%) stated lliai labor-man-
agement relations were ver)' good ihaii in any West-
ern (:ounir>- ( the Nether lands was the next lowest at
Why do persons from ex-communisi east-
ern European countries and Westerners
respond so differently to the union cjnes-
tions in the ISSP? How can we rationalize
the view of workers in ex-communist coun-
I8.f>%), bnt at the same time, the propor t ion of
Hungariansdescribinj^ labor relations as quite or very
bad (3.1%) was m u i h smaller than the propor t ion of
workers in Western countries ( the IK- \ [ lowest was
Israel, with 4%).
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Table S. Percentages Who Strongly Favor Government Intervention in the I.ahor Market:
Seven Ex-Communisi Couniries and Fifteen Capitalist Countries, Various Years.
Country
Ex-communist
Bulgaria
Easl Germany
Hungary
Poland
Russia
SlrtvenJH
Unweighted Mean
Capitalist
Australia
Austria
Canada
Great Britain
Israel
Italy
Japan
Ncihfrlands
New Ze;iiiiiid
Norway
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
USA
West Germany
Unweighted Mean
Reduce
Income Differences
1987
32
36
34
35
21
17
U
S
17
18
1992
61
23
42
33
30
39
31
33
10
27
17
27
40
16
17
16
10
20
20
1993
63
34
39
38
38
32
32
39
12
22
32
29
30
13
15
15
19
7
2.i
20
Control Wages
by l.-aw
1990
50
16
33
6
24
21
7
7
9
12
Providejobs
forAU
1987
70
45
72
62
36
24
23
17
17
35
25
1992
36
55
52
50
75
36
51
10
31
16
21
57
19
37
26
17
22
26
Provide Basic
Income for All
1987
40
40
20
20
10
12
7
17
14
7992
77
SO
50
51
47
71
27
50
13
13
19
28
37
21
35
9
10
19
20
Source: 1S8P (1987, 1990, 1992. 1993).
tries that unions are not good for the coun-
try, are too weak, and are needed to protect
workers? Our explanation is that these
responses reflect two aspects of" the experi-
ence with unions under communism: the
past role of unions as transmission belts of
the state, and the weakness of newly emerg-
ing or changing traditional unions—one of
several legacies of the country's communist
labor sys;tem.
Attitudes Toward (he
State in Economic Life
Under communism, the state dominated
economic life, with adverse consequences
for economic progress and for worker and
citizen satisfaction. By overiurning com-
munism, these countries have committed
themselves to developing a market economy
with a much smaller governmental role in
economic affairs than in their past. Still,
the decades of governmeni-doniinated eco-
nomic life and communist egalitarian ide-
ology may have left a legacy of "statism" in
these countries that would produce atti-
tudes toward state ititerventions in wage
and eniploytnentdifferentfrom those found
among people brought up in market econo-
mies.
Table 8 presents responses to ISSP ques-
tions from the 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1993
modules that cast light on this issue. It
shows a wide difference in attitudes toward
state interventions between eastern Euro-
pean and Western countries, and some dif-
ferences atnong the ex-communist coun-
tries as well. The figures under the heading
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"Reduce Income Differences" show that a
larger proportion of workers in the former
communist countries than in the capitalist
ctmntries believe that the government is
responsible for reducing dilterenccs in in-
come. In 1987, 34% of persons in the two
ex-communist couniries for which we have
data, Hungar) and Poland, strongly agreed
with this statement, proportions that far
exceed those in Western countrie.s save for
Austria. In 1992, for which we have infor-
mation for seven ex-communist countries,
the results are similar. On average, 33% of
people in the ex-communist countries
agreed strongly that governments should
reduce income differences, compared to
just 20% in the capitalist countries (though
many in the capitalist countries agreed
somewhat). The sole countries whose re-
sponses overlap those in the other set of
countries in this contrast are Italy and Aus-
tria among the Western countries and
Czechoslovakia among the ex-communist
countries. The figures for 1993 show an
even greater divergence between the ex-
communist and the capitalist countries, with
nrt overlap at all!
There is less consistency among the
former communisi countries in whether
respondents support controlling wages by
law. The East Germans strongly favor such
controls, but the Hungarians do not. The
contrast between the East and West Ger-
mans on tliis isstie is striking.
On the employment side, the ISSP asked
in 1987 and in 1992 whether the gcwern-
ment sbould providejobs for all. Tbe re-
spondents in the two eastern European
countries covered in 1987, Hungary and
Poland, were far more likely to agree with
this proposition than were respondent's in
the Western countries. In 1992, when the
ISSP asked this same question in six ex-
comnuuiist countries, the unweighted av-
erage proportion of persons in those coun-
tries wbo agreed strongly was 51%, com-
pared to 2f)%> in the capitalist countries.
The greater support for government play-
ing a role in income and employment de-
termination in former communist coun-
tries shows up. finally, in responses to the
following question: "Should government
provide basic income for all?" Only Hun-
gary provided data on thisquestion in 1987.
There, tbe proportion strongly agreeing
was 40%, far above the corresponding pro-
portion in capitalist countries. The differ-
ence in 1992, for which we have data for
seven ex-communist countries, is even
greater.
In sum, while ibere art- some coimtry
differences, the overwhelming pattern in
these data is a greater proclivity for relying
on the state"'among persons ironi ex-com-
munist couutries than among Westerners-—
consistent with the legacy hypothesis.
Conclusions
We have uncovered substantial differ-
ences between survey respondents in former
communist countries and those in Western
couniries in responses to diverse questions
about attitudes toward earnings inequality,
job satisfaction, working conditions, unions,
and tbe role ofthe state in regulating labor
market outcomes. In ISSP surveys con-
ducted over the years 19H7-93, tbe citizens
of former communist countries evinced a
greater desire for egalitarianism, less satis-
faction with tbeir jobs, more support for
strong unions, and more support for state
intervention tban did most Westerners. At
the same time, as perceived occupational
earnings differentials widened in these
cotmiries over the course of tbe breakdown
of communism and the transition to more
capitalistic systems between 1987 and 1992,
tolerance for those differentials increa.sed
substantially, Without gainsaying the im-
portant differetues in outcomes and atti-
tudes among ex-communist countries and
among Western countries, we believe that
it is reasonable to interpret the broad pat-
tern of differences between the two groups
as reflecting a legacy of communist eco-
nomics.
"•Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski's (1993) analy-
sis of Polish public (ipiiiion polls gave resull.s thai are
consislcni witli ours. Table 7 in Rose and liacrpfer
(1994) also shows suhsEaiiiial "tollcciivist values" in
eastern European countries, iliongb will) variation
among countries and qucsiioiis.
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Appendix Table AI
Responses to the ISSP, 1987-1992
Gtmniry
Ex-Conununist:
Bulgaria
C/.erhnslovakia
East (Jcrmaiiy
Huiigai7
Poland
Russia
Slovenia
Capitalist:
Australia
Austria
Canada
Eire
Great Britain
Israel
halv
Neihertands
New Zealand
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
USA
West Germany
To ml
1987
2606
394 S
1574
972
1212
1027
I63«
987
1564
1397
16920
1989
1000
2398
1997
972
1297
1133
1028
1690
1S48
1453
1575
16391
1990
1028
977
1005
1197
991
983
1517
1217
2812
11727
1991
1486
1000
1063
20S0
1005
1257
991
983
1635
1070
1506
1359
1346
16781
1992
1198
IIOI
1094
1250
1636
1983
1049
2203
1027
iOO4
1066
996
1239
1538
749
1273
2297
22703
1993
1183
1005
1092
1167
1641
1931
1032
1467
957
1261
1198
1000
1852
1271
1414
1414
1557
1014
25969
AU
2381
2106
4700
8000
8283
3914
4161
6175
3996
2471
3939
7290
4313
6017
6815
3580
7823
2163
987
8423
10441
107978
Notes: Data for 1993 were obtained from the ISSP 1993 Source book (ZA Study 2450). Data are also available
in the ISSP {but not used in this paper) for Northern Ireland and the Philippines for a number of yearsand Spain
and Japan IIM 1993 only.
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